Ukraine’s Black Sea ports remain officially open, but that no longer guarantees vessel arrivals. Intensified attacks, crew concerns, war-risk insurance exposure and charterparty restrictions are forcing owners and operators to reconsider whether a port call remains commercially acceptable.
A port can be technically operational and still become commercially unusable.
That is the position now developing across parts of the Black Sea. Ukraine has not formally closed its main maritime export ports, yet some shipowners have temporarily stopped sending vessels to load agricultural cargoes following a sharp escalation in attacks on ships and port infrastructure.
Maersk has separately suspended its feeder service through Chornomorsk Fishing Port and redirected affected cargo towards Constanța. On the opposite side of the Black Sea, attacks on tankers serving the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal interrupted Kazakhstan’s principal crude-export route and contributed to a severe reduction in national oil production before loadings resumed on 27 July.
The most important issue is therefore no longer whether a port authority says that a port is open.
The real question is whether the owner, Master, insurer, crew, charterer and terminal operator are collectively prepared to accept the exposure required to complete the voyage.
The Difference Between an Open Port and a Callable Port
Port status is usually understood in operational terms.
A port may have functioning pilots, tugs, berths, navigation channels, customs personnel and cargo-handling equipment. Its harbour master may continue authorising movements, and terminals may still be accepting cargo.
Commercial shipping, however, operates through a much wider chain of approvals.
Before a vessel proceeds, the owner must be satisfied that the ship can enter, remain alongside, conduct cargo operations and depart without exposing the vessel or crew to an unacceptable level of danger. Insurance cover must remain available. The crew’s contractual rights must be respected. The charterparty must permit the voyage, and the terminal must be sufficiently reliable to justify the risk.
When any one of these elements fails, the vessel may not sail—even when the port itself remains officially open.
This is what appears to be happening in the Black Sea. The physical infrastructure has not disappeared, but commercial confidence is retreating.
Shipowners, Not Ukraine, Suspended the Arrivals
On 23 July, Ukraine’s agriculture minister said shipowners had temporarily stopped vessel arrivals intended to collect agricultural exports from the country’s Black Sea ports.
The Ukrainian government had not imposed a general restriction on vessel traffic. The decision was being made commercially by owners responding to the deteriorating security environment.
Reuters reported that Russian forces had struck 28 civilian vessels between 20 June and 20 July, according to figures attributed to regional prosecutors. A strike on a corn-carrying vessel on 19 July reportedly killed ten people. Ukraine was also estimated to have lost approximately one-third of its Black Sea grain-export capacity because of damage to terminals and related infrastructure.
The danger was reinforced when the cargo vessel Golden Leo sank near Odesa on 26 July. Ukrainian authorities said the vessel had suffered serious damage after being struck on 19 July while carrying corn from Chornomorsk.
Russia has stated that its attacks are directed at port infrastructure and vessels supporting Ukrainian military activity. Ukrainian authorities maintain that civilian shipping and export infrastructure are being targeted. Whatever the competing descriptions of the intended targets, the commercial consequence is the same: owners must assess a demonstrated possibility of a vessel being damaged while approaching, loading at or departing from a port.
Maersk’s Suspension Shows How Commercial Closure Happens
Maersk announced on 22 July that its feeder operator could no longer continue serving Ukraine through Chornomorsk Fishing Port because of conditions affecting the operating area.
The carrier suspended the service until further notice. Import cargo intended for Chornomorsk was redirected to Constanța in Romania, while customers with export bookings were offered cancellation or a change of loading port.
An important distinction must be maintained. Chornomorsk Fishing Port and the state-owned Chornomorsk Commercial Sea Port are separate operators within the wider Chornomorsk port area. Ukrainian authorities said the principal commercial port continued operating despite the attacks.
But that distinction also demonstrates the central point.
A government does not need to close an entire port for a shipping service to disappear. The withdrawal of one feeder operator, terminal customer, liner service or group of bulk-carrier owners can remove practical access to the market for a substantial volume of cargo.
The port remains open. The transport chain does not.
The CPC Disruption Extended the Risk Beyond Ukrainian Ports
The deterioration has not been limited to vessels serving Ukraine.
On 19 July, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium reported UAV attacks on two tankers—ASIA and NISSOS IOS—during loading operations at its offshore single-point moorings near Novorossiysk.
A fire was reported aboard ASIA and was extinguished with emergency assistance. CPC said there were no casualties, no requests for medical assistance and no oil spill, but loading operations were stopped while damage was assessed.
The interruption subsequently developed into a wider suspension of CPC loading operations. Kazakhstan reduced production because crude could not be exported at the expected rate. Reuters reported that the country’s oil and gas condensate output fell to approximately one million barrels per day on 26 July, compared with a June average of about 2.16 million barrels per day.
CPC loadings resumed on 27 July, with two tankers berthed at the terminal. Nevertheless, the episode demonstrated how quickly a maritime security incident can move upstream from the vessel to storage tanks, pipelines and producing oilfields.
A resumed loading does not immediately restore confidence. Owners and charterers will look for sustained operational stability, not a single successful berthing.
The Real Decision Chain Behind a Black Sea Port Call
1. The Owner and Master must accept the risk
The Master remains responsible for the safety of the vessel, crew and cargo. The owner must also consider the ship’s value, flag requirements, company security procedures and obligations to insurers.
Under BIMCO’s CONWARTIME 2025 clause, a vessel is not required to proceed to or through an area where, in the reasonable judgement of the Master or owners, the vessel, cargo, crew or other persons aboard may be exposed to war risks.
The clause can apply whether the danger existed when the charter was agreed or arose later.
This does not give owners an unrestricted right to reject any voyage merely because a region is politically unstable. The contractual wording, available evidence and level of danger still matter. But a series of direct attacks on merchant ships gives owners far stronger grounds for reassessing the employment.
2. Insurance must remain commercially workable
Insurance availability is not simply a yes-or-no question.
Cover may technically remain available while additional premiums, deductibles, exclusions, reporting obligations or security conditions make the voyage uneconomic. Insurers may require prior notification, specific routing, reduced time in port or compliance with security recommendations.
BIMCO’s current war-risk clauses recognise additional war-risk premiums and certain additional insurance costs. Depending on the charterparty wording, these costs may be reimbursable by charterers when the vessel proceeds into an exposed area.
But reimbursement does not remove the physical risk. An owner may still conclude that no premium adequately compensates for possible loss of life, vessel damage, detention or prolonged immobilisation.
3. Crew rights can stop the voyage
Crew availability is another critical limitation.
For ships and seafarers covered by relevant International Bargaining Forum arrangements, designated Warlike Operations Areas can provide seafarers with the right to decline an assignment. Applicable arrangements may also require repatriation, additional wages and enhanced death or disability compensation.
Even where a formal right of refusal does not apply, a responsible operator must consider crew welfare, nationality, employment agreements, experience, mental readiness and the availability of safe crew-change arrangements.
A vessel cannot be treated as commercially available if a competent and willing crew cannot legally and safely be maintained aboard it.
4. Charterparty wording decides who carries the exposure
War-risk clauses, safe-port warranties, trading limits and employment provisions determine whether an owner can refuse an order, request an alternative port or recover additional costs.
Under VOYWAR 2025, owners may have rights to cancel before loading or request a safe alternative when performance may expose the vessel or crew to war risks. After loading has commenced, the clause also provides mechanisms for alternative discharge or routing, depending on the circumstances and contractual requirements.
Poorly drafted fixtures leave room for disputes over:
- Whether the port remains safe;
- Whether the danger was already known when the vessel was fixed;
- Who pays additional insurance premiums and crew bonuses;
- Whether time remains on hire;
- Whether cancellation amounts to a breach;
- Who bears diversion, waiting and alternative-discharge costs.
In a rapidly changing war-risk environment, the rider clauses may become more commercially important than the freight rate itself.
5. The berth must remain usable long enough to complete the call
A vessel is most exposed when its freedom of movement is restricted.
While alongside, it may have limited ability to manoeuvre, reduced notice of an incoming threat and dependence on shore power, terminal personnel, loading arms, conveyor systems, pilots and tugs.
Owners will therefore examine more than whether the berth escaped physical damage. They will consider:
- The likelihood of terminal shutdown during the call;
- Expected waiting time at anchorage;
- Availability of shelters or emergency departure procedures;
- Tug and pilot readiness;
- The reliability of air-defence warnings;
- Whether cargo operations can be stopped and the vessel safely disconnected;
- The risk of becoming trapped by channel closure or harbour restrictions.
A terminal that repeatedly opens and closes may be technically operational but commercially unattractive.
Grain, Oil and Freight Markets Will Feel the Effects Differently
For Ukrainian grain exporters, reduced owner appetite means fewer vessels competing for cargoes. Owners willing to trade may demand higher freight, tighter cancellation rights, faster loading commitments and full recovery of war-risk costs.
Alternative routes through the Danube and overland rail networks remain available, but shifting large agricultural volumes away from deepwater Black Sea terminals introduces additional handling, capacity and transport constraints. Ukrainian officials have said these alternatives could absorb some displaced exports, but prolonged disruption at the main ports would have a much greater effect than a stoppage lasting only several days.
For Kazakhstan, the CPC interruption revealed the vulnerability created by dependence on one dominant export corridor. When tankers stopped loading, the problem moved rapidly from the marine terminal to national oil production.
Containerised cargo faces a different disruption. Maersk’s diversion towards Constanța does not necessarily eliminate the cargo flow, but it changes the route. Customers may face additional inland transport, border movements, documentation, transit time and cost.
The shared problem is not complete closure. It is unpredictability.
Shipping can price a known distance, port charge or canal toll. It is far harder to price the possibility that a vessel may arrive but be unable to berth, load, depart or retain insurance cover.
What the Market Should Watch Next
The clearest indication of recovery will not be a government announcement stating that the ports remain open. It will be the sustained return of commercial vessels.
The industry should monitor:
- Actual vessel arrivals, particularly whether several owners resume calls rather than isolated ships completing previously committed voyages.
- War-risk insurance conditions, including any changes to premiums, deductibles, geographical limits or notice requirements.
- Maersk’s Chornomorsk service, and whether cargo continues to be diverted through Constanța.
- CPC loading continuity, rather than simply the initial resumption reported on 27 July.
- Grain-terminal activity and freight offers, which will show whether traders and owners believe operations can remain stable.
- Further attacks on merchant vessels, particularly ships alongside terminals or operating in established approach corridors.
Final Thoughts
The present situation illustrates a hard commercial truth: governments can declare ports open, but they cannot order commercial confidence into existence.
A functioning berth is only one part of a successful port call. The vessel must remain insurable. The crew must be willing and contractually able to proceed. The owner and Master must consider the area acceptably safe. The charterparty must allocate the risk, and the terminal must remain operational long enough to complete the cargo movement.
In the Black Sea, several of these conditions are now under pressure simultaneously.
CPC’s resumed loadings show that operations can restart quickly. They do not prove that the threat has passed. Likewise, Ukraine’s ports may remain officially open, but persistent attacks can remove enough owners, services and insurers from the market to create the commercial equivalent of a closure.
The decisive indicator will therefore not be the status displayed by the port authority.
It will be whether the next owner accepts the fixture.